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INDUSTRY AND COUNTRY EFFECTS ON MANAGERS' PERCEPTIONS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES
International management research highlights political, government
policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties. Strategy studies focus on input
supply, product market, and competitive uncertainties. This study develops
and tests the reliability of an instrument for measuring managers' uncertainty
perceptions. Data analyses using an international sample provide insights
into the relative importance of country and industry factors for explaining
managers' perceptions of different environmental uncertainties.
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Managers operating in the international business context confront a
variety of uncertain environmental factors. In the past, international risk
management researchers have focused primarily on the assessment of political,
government policy, and macroeconomic (particularly foreign exchange)
uncertainties and appropriate organizational responses. This emphasis differs
markedly from the risk management discussions found in the strategy field,
where researchers view industry dynamics as giving rise to managerial
uncertainties. As such, the strategy field emphasizes uncertainties regarding
product and process technologies, the availability of critical inputs, product
market demand, and strategic moves by competitors and potential entrants.
Political, government policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties reflect
international management researchers' interest in the country level of
analysis. By contrast, much of the strategy literature, particularly that
grounded in industrial organization economics, sees industry~ rather than
country, as the relevant level of analysis for risk assessment. Porter's
(1985) discussion of competitive strategy under uncertainty exemplifies the
industry-oriented risk management perspective. While recent strategy research
reflects a growing interest in integrating strategy and international
management perspectives (see, e.g., Porter, 1990), such integration is not yet
evident in most risk management research.
The disparity between international management and strategy emphases on
country and industry levels of analysis for risk assessment presents an
important empirical question: do country, industry, or a combination of both
determine the uncertainties managers perceive? This question, motivated by
the disparities between previous strategy and international risk management
research, has practical relevance to managerial decisions regarding product
and international market diversification. If, for example, uncertainties
differ systematically across industries but not across countries, then
assessing the particular country context is irrelevant to determining
corporate risk exposure. Alternatively, if uncertainties differ across
countries, international diversification may reduce the variability of




This paper makes two primary contributions to the existing management
research on uncertainty. First, the research develops and tests a perceived
environmental uncertainty measurement instrument grounded in strategy and
international management theory. We are not aware of any previous research
which has developed and tested measures of perceived environmental uncertainty
differentiating the managerially relevant uncertainties of interest to
strategy and international management researchers. Second, the study tests
the relevance of country and industry effects on managers' perceptions of
environmental uncertainties.
The opening section of this study provides theoretical background on
country and industry effects on uncertainties and motivates testable
hypotheses. The following section discusses the problems with existing
uncertainty measurement instruments and proposes an alternative approach. The
empirical section begins with a description of the sample. The unique data
collected for this research consisted of responses from nearly five hundred
managers in 211 firms in six Latin American countries. The empirical section
examines the reliability of the perceived uncertainty instrument developed in
this research. Next, data analyses provide insights into the relative
importance of country and industry factors for explaining managers'
perceptions of environmental uncertainties. The final portion of the paper
discusses the empirical findings and their implications.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
·Uncertainty· refers to the unpredictability of environmental or
organizational variables that impact corporate performance. A conceptual
shortcoming in much of the existing literature on uncertainty is the tendency
to isolate particular managerial uncertainties to the exclusion of others.
For example, international risk management research has produced streams of
research on political and foreign exchange uncertainties. Strategy
researchers have examined factor and product market. technological. and
competitive uncertainties. Little research integrates these various
perspectives on organizational uncertainties.
Miller (1992) proposed a threefold categorization of managerial
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uncertainties. Managers may perceive as uncertain (1) general environmental,
(2) industry, and (3) firm-specific variables. General environmental
uncertainties include political and government policy instability, and
macroeconomic uncertainty. Industry uncertainties encompass input market,
product market, competitive, and technological uncertainties. The third
category, firm-specific uncertainties, includes uncertainties regarding
operations, research and development, and management and employee actions.
Assessing these various uncertainties is relevant to formulating
organizational strategic and financial risk management responses. For
example, firms often purchase financial market hedging instruments (such as
forward or futures contracts and options) to reduce exposures to unexpected
movements in commodity prices, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates. In
the absence of market instruments to hedge exposures to uncertainties, firms
may make real changes in strategies to reduce risk. One such case occurs when
firms seek to establish joint ventures for new product development in response
to technological uncertainty. Another case is backward vertical integration
to reduce input uncertainty. Many other examples could be cited illustrating
the managerial relevance of differentiating environmental uncertainties.
In order to assess the uncertainties of interest to managers, it would
be quite useful to know the extent to which uncertainties generalize across
business firms. Knowing if uncertainties differ systematically across
countries and/or industries would provide an indication to managers of the
relevant level of analysis for assessing corporate risk exposures.
Previous international risk research raised the issue of the relevant
level of analysis for assessing risks. Robock (1971), Kobrin (1982), and
Simon (1982) distinguished between political microrisks and macrorisks.
Macrorisks impact the full spectrum of business firms in a country.
Microrisks affect certain business activities exclusively. Drawing on the
macrorisk/microrisk distinction, both Ting (1988) and Lessard (1988) observe
that many risks are peculiar to specific corporate investments.
The starting point for this study was the hypothesis that managers'
perceptions of environmental uncertainties differ across countries and
industries in a manner consistent with the levels of analysis indicated in the
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Miller (1992) typology of uncertainties. That is, political, government
policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties were expected to differ across
countries but not across industries. Political uncertainty refers to the
unpredictability of changes in political regimes (Shubik, 1983; Ting, 1988).
Policy uncertainty, on the other hand, indicates instability in government
policies that impact the business community (Ting, 1988). Both political and
policy changes are subject to national social influences and sovereign choice,
and, as such, should differ from one country to another. Macroeconomic
uncertainty encompasses fluctuations in the level of economic activity and
prices. To the extent that national product and financial markets are
segmented, managers operating in different countries should experience
distinct levels of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Previous discussions in the international management field generally
assumed differentiation of political, policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties
at the country level but have not examined whether this assumption is
consistent with managers' perceptions. The assumed relevance of country
analyses underlies the existence of professional country risk assessment
services. This paper tests the legitimacy of that assumption. The specific
hypothesis is:
Hl: Political, government policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties
differ across countries but not across industries.
Several arguments raise questions about the validity of this hypothesis.
First, consider some reasons why national distinctions may be irrelevant to
managers' perceptions of general environmental uncertainties. One possibility
is that there are limited objective political, policy, and macroeconomic
differences across countries. In many regions of the world, political,
policy, and macroeconomic instability spillover from one country to another.
Alternatively, international collaboration on political and economic policy
have the potential to homogenize general environmental conditions across
countries. In economically integrated regions, countries may be
undifferentiated in their levels of macroeconomic uncertainty.
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Even if objective differences exist in political, policy, and
macroeconomic stability, managers' characterizations of their countries may
not reflect these differences. Managers may characterize current
uncertainties with respect to their own past experience (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973). If so, managers' perceptions would not share a common reference point
across countries for making cross-sectional international comparisons.
Managers also appear to have different tolerances for ambiguity across
countries (Hofstede, 1980) which may exaggerate or diminish perceived
uncertainty differentials across countries relative to some ·objective"
measure of environmental instability.
A second alternative to the hypothesis (HI) is that industry effects are
actually significant in explaining the perceived uncertainty of political,
policy, and macroeconomic environmental components. This could be due, for
example, to differential effects of political change or government policy
decisions across industries, making political and policy uncertainty much more
salient in certain industries than in others. Certain industries may be more
severely impacted by unpredictable macroeconomic fluctuations (e.g., cyclical
or interest rate sensitive industries). If these conditions hold, industry
effects could be found to be significant in determining political, policy, and
macroeconomic uncertainties.
Uncertainties regarding inputs used by the firm, competition, and
product market demand should vary across industries. Input market uncertainty
refers to unpredictability in the acquisition of adequate quantities and
qualities of production inputs. Product market uncertainty results from
unpredictable changes in product demand. Competitive uncertainty covers the
uncertainties regarding strategic moves by existing firms and potential
entrants into an industry.
The relevance of industry analyses in assessing these managerial
uncertainties is a basic contention of risk management discussions in the
strategy field. The three categories of industry-level uncertainties
correspond with Porter's (1980) widely cited five forces of industry
competition. Input and supply uncertainty coincide with distinct forces in
Porter's model, while competitive uncertainty encompasses potential entrants,
7
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industry competitors, and substitutes. These factors affect both returns and
risk in an industry. Porter (1985) demonstrates the use of the five forces
framework for assessing industry uncertainties.
In addition to industry effects, segmentation of markets by country
divisions should affect input, competitive, and product demand uncertainties.
Variations in these uncertainties across countries result from differing
national resource endowments and government policies. Government policy
decisions regarding, for example, the exchange rate and availability of
foreign exchange to the private sector, business regulation, corporate taxes,
tariffs and subsidies, and restrictions on the entry of new firms and
technologies contribute to shaping the competitive forces within an industry.
Policy differences across countries contribute to industry segmentation.
Managerial perceptions of input, competitive, and demand uncertainties should
differ due to variations in the nature of industry forces across countries.
The impact of country differences is evident, for example, when the
uncertainty regarding government policy toward business (e.g., taxation or
regulation) results in uncertainty regarding new entrants or strategic moves
by firms in an industry. Uncertain foreign exchange rates can create
uncertainty regarding the cost and availability of an industry's imported
inputs and the value of exports. Based on such observations, Austin (1990)
refers to governments as "mega-forces· shaping industry structure and dynamics
in developing countries.
The preceding discussion can be summarized in the following hypothesis:
H2: Input, product market demand, and competitive uncertainties
differ across both countries and industries.
Two alternative hypotheses deserve consideration. First, the above
discussion suggests that country-industry interactions may explain differences
in input, competitive, and demand uncertainties. While testing for
interaction effects could provide some interesting empirical results, the




A second alternative hypothesis is that uncertainty perceptions are
particular to firms and, as such, country and industry factors do not provide
a basis for explaining uncertainty perceptions. support for firm-specific
uncertainties can be found in Yasai-Ardekani's (1986) conceptual model in
which managers' environmental perceptions vary with individual,
organizational, and industry characteristics. Similarly, Ting (1988) and
Lessard (1988) claim many risks are investment-specific microrisks. To the
extent that organizational factors determine uncertainty perceptions,
perceptions of environmental uncertainties are firm-specific and do not vary
systematically across industries nor countries.
MEASURING MANAGERIAL UNCERTAINTIES
Background
A major obstacle to empirical research on perceived environmental
uncertainties is the lack of well established measurement instruments.
Existing measures from organization theory suffer from conceptual problems and
inadequate reliability and validity. Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum point
out, ·For the most part, contingency researchers have not examined rigorously
the conceptual and methodological adequacy of their own uncertainty
instruments. The primary means for validating uncertainty instruments has
been face validity and the researchers' a priori expectations· (1975b: 613).
Their statement is still true today.
In the strategic management and organization literature, the two most
widely applied approaches to measuring perceived uncertainty are those of
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Duncan (1972). The Lawrence and Lorsch
uncertainty measures are not very useful for research on environmental
uncertainties because their indicators encompass primarily intraorganizational
rather than external environmental uncertainties. The three main areas
covered in the Lawrence and Lorsch instrument are the clarity of job
requirements, the degree of difficulty in accomplishing assigned jobs, and the
length of time required to receive performance feedback. A further difficulty
was pointed out by Tosi, Aldag, and Storey (1973), and Downey, Hellriegel, and
Slocum (1975b) who found that the Lawrence and Lorschuncertainty subscales
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did not demonstrate adequate reliability.
Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum (1975b) criticized Duncan's (1972)
measure of perceived environmental uncertainty for deficiencies in scale
construction and low scale reliability. An additional problem with the Duncan
measure was the absence of significant positive relations between Duncan's
perceptual measures and the four criterion measures of environmental
uncertainty used by Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum (1975b).
While these problems suggest a need for some modification of the Duncan
(1972) measures, the primary shortcoming of Duncan's approach for strategy and
international business research is the aggregation of uncertainties regarding
a diverse range of environmental components into a single uncertainty measure.
Duncan's perceived environmental uncertainty instrument lists five components
of the external environment: customers, suppliers, competitors, socio-
political, and technological. Rather than keeping these measures separate,
Duncan pooled respondents' scores on these five dimensions to obtain simple-
complex and static-dynamic environmental indices. Duncan's measure of
perceived uncertainty reduced multiple items to a single scale. Bourgeois
(1985) used a similar procedure to measure perceived uncertainty. The pooling
of perceived uncertainty scores on multiple items into a single scale presumes
environmental uncertainty is a single, unidimensional construct.
By contrast, Tosi and Slocum (1984) argued that uncertainty is most
appropriately measured in relation to specific environmental components. They
identified the following uncertain environmental sectors for business
organizations: customers, capital sources, raw product supplies, and
technology and science.
Hrebiniak and Snow (1980) offered evidence that managers distinguish
between the levels of uncertainty associated with distinct environmental
components. As part of that study, managers ranked 19 items about their
industry which loaded on five factors reflecting the degree of predictability
of financial/capital markets, government regulation and intervention, the
actions of competitors, suppliers actions, and general conditions.
Unfortunately, Hrebiniak and Snow simply describe these results without
presenting the actual factor loading pattern. The usefulness of the study for
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future research is also limited because the authors do not list the 19
questionnaire items. Nevertheless, their study provides preliminary evidence
from four industries that managers perceive their environments to consist of
distinct uncertain components.
The uncertainty measurement instrument developed in this research
resembles most closely that of Miles and Snow (1978). Based on earlier work
by Dill (1958), Katz and Kahn (1966), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and Thompson
(1967), Miles and Snow's measurement instrument included 25 items falling into
six broad categories: (1) suppliers of raw materials and components, (2)
competitors' actions, (3) customers, (4) financial/capital market,_ (5)
government regulatory agencies, and (6) actions of labor unions. Respondents
classified each item on a seven point scale ranging from ·predictable" to
"unpredictable." Miles and Snow reported averages from each of the six scales
and an aggregate average combining the six scales for two industries--
electronics (n = 22) and food-processing (n = 27). They did not, however,
report subscores for each of the six uncertainty categories nor did they
examine the measurement properties of the perceived environmental uncertainty
(PEU) instrument itself.
Jackson, Schuler, and Vredenburgh (1987) adopted the Miles and Snow
(1978) classification of uncertain environmental components. They note that
economic, political, sociocultural events, and technology may be sources of
uncertainty. Hitt, Ireland, and Palia (1982) used the Miles and Snow (1978)
PEU measure. As with Miles and Snow's original PEU measure, their analyses
were based solely on the aggregate PEU scores derived from the summation of
the six scale averages.
The perceived environmental uncertainty measurement instrument developed
in this research departs from those used in previous studies by disaggregating
managers' uncertainty perceptions regarding distinct elements of their
organizations' environments. The disaggregation of uncertainty perceptions
responds to criticisms of the conceptual and operational approaches to
uncertainty found in previous research. Milliken contends:
... aggregating uncertainty scores into a global measure of
perceived environmental uncertainty, as has past research (e.g.,
Downey et al., 1977; Duncan, 1972), may mask significant
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differences between types of uncertainty. Such a masking of
differences may be of particular concern when the goal of research
is to understand the process of environmental interpretation
(1990: 58).
Leblebici and Salancik offer a similar critique:
Although it is clear that diversity and volatility are related to
organizational functioning, investigators in this area have failed
to appreciate the need to specify particular conditions of
uncertainty. Studies in this area have been more global, designed
to characterize an organizational environment abstractly, removed
from its particulars. Such underspecification has been the basis
of the chief criticism of such studies (1981: 579).
Drawing from international business, strategy, and related research,
Miller (1992) developed a typology for decomposing the environment into
distinct elements when measuring uncertainty perceptions. In keeping with the
uncertainty categories presented in that article, the questionnaire developed
for this study includes two general environmental uncertainty categories--
political and government policy, and macroeconomic. Corresponding to the
industry level, the survey includes items related to input, product market,
competitive, and technological uncertainties. Managers were asked to indicate
their evaluations of the predictability of each of these environmental
components. Rankings were recorded on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (easy
to predict) to 7 (not predictable). The appendix contains the specific items
included in the PEU instrument. 1
uncertainty It~ Reliability .
Previous management research indicates uncertainty perceptions may vary
across individuals within a given firm. Several studies (Anderson &. Paine,
1975; Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975a, 1975b; Downey & Slocum, 1975;
Duncan, 1972; Jackson, Schuler, & Vredenburgh, 1987; Lorenzi, 1980; McCaskey,
1976) contend individual factors such as tolerance for ambiguity, cognitive
complexity, and internal versus external locus of control affect managers'
perceptions of environmental uncertainty. Lorenzi, Sims, and Slocum (1981)
showed that perceived environmental uncertainty results from a combination of
environmental stimuli, individual characteristics, and the degree of task-
related specificity of the PEU measure. General measures of environmental
uncertainty were found to be strongly influenced by individual
12
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characteristics. When the measures were more specific or task-related, the
objective level of environmental stimulus was found to be much more
significant than individual characteristics in explaining uncertainty
perceptions.
The influence of individual characteristics on uncertainty perceptions
is consistent with earlier work by Dearborn and Simon (1958) indicating
executives' functional areas within their organizations affect environmental
perceptions. Similarly, Tosi, Aldag, and Storey (1973), in attempting to
explain the lack of significant relations between the Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967) subjective uncertainty scales and objective measures of uncertainty,
speculated that managers may not perceive uncertainty outside their functional
areas. Bourgeois (1985) argued that since top management team members attend
to different functional area responsibilities, their attention is on different
segments of the environment and, as such, they experience different levels of
perceived uncertainty. A study by Ireland, et al. (1987) found support for
differences in environmental uncertainty perceptions across managerial levels.
That study, however, found significant differences in uncertainty perceptions
between top and lower managerial levels in the organization but not between
top and middle managers.
If uncertainty perceptions are not shared by top-level managers within
firms, we would question previous research seeking to explain organizational
strategy, structure, and processes as responses to uncertainty. It is much
less likely that uncertainty perceptions impact organizational strategic
decisions if they are idiosyncratic to individuals than if they are shared by
members of the top management team. If, however, several managers indicate
similar uncertainty perceptions, this would provide evidence for the
reliability of the PEU measures and the legitimacy of treating uncertainties
as explanatory variables in organizational research. The first step in the
empirical analysis involved determining which of the indicators demonstrate




Description of the sample
This study departed from previous uncertainty research by creating and
analyzing an international data set rather than focusing solely on managers in
a single country. Managers from six Latin American countries--Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama--provided data. The
common business language (Spanish) shared by the sample countries eliminated
the possibility of language effects accounting for differences in the survey
responses across countries.
All of the managers were selected from the top management team in each
organization. Thus, the perceptions represent those of the dominant coalition
who directly affect organizational strategic decisions. While all were top
management team members, their backgrounds included work in a wide variety of
functional areas.
Previous research cautions against casual use of single key informant
responses to represent organizational level constructs (Phillips, 1981;
Seidler, 1974). In order to explicitly investigate the convergent validity of
responses across informants within firms, questionnaire response were
solicited from three managers per firm. For each firm in the sample,
responses to the questionnaire items were solicited in an interview with one
of the members of the top management team at their place of work. When
possible, an additional one or two managers from each firm completed a
questionnaire containing the same PEU items. No interview was conducted with
the second and third questionnaire respondents. Since not all firms agreed to
have additional managers participate in the study, the number of respondents
per firm varied from one to three. 2 A total of 497 managers from 211 firms
provided usable responses. Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample firms
by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code and country.
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the size of the firms, as measured by annual sales,
and the percent of domestic ownership. Of the 211 firms, 157 had majority
local ownership, while 31 firms were wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.





This study used an analysis of variance method to obtain item
reliability estimates (Ebel, 1951). The model used was a simple one-way
random effects ANOVA model (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). An F test
indicates the extent to which firm effects account for differences in
managerial uncertainty perceptions.) If firm effects are not significant, the
indicator demonstrates poor reliability. The F test uses a ratio of the firm
mean square to the error mean square. The ANOVA model error term encompasses
both the variations due to differing data collection methods (interviews and
written questionnaires) and individual managerial characteristics. The .05
level was adopted as the decision criterion for determining whether firm
effects were significant in explaining differences in managers' reported
uncertainty scores.
Since the number of respondents varied from one to three in each firm,
the sample was unbalanced. Of the 211 firms in the sample, 131 provided
responses from three managers, 24 provided two responses, and 56 had a single
respondent. 4 Given this unbalanced design, the appropriate analysis of
variance methodology was the regression approach to ANOVA (Neter, Wasserman, &
Kutner, 1985). This method was implemented using the SAS (1985) generalized
least squares procedure. Tables 4A and 4B report the F statistics and sample
sizes for each ANOVA. Respondents' omitted items caused differences in the
sample sizes from one item to another.
*************************
Put Tables 4A and 4B here
*************************
Most of the perceived uncertainty items demonstrate adequate
reliability. Eight of the ten political and government policy PEU indicators
and three of the four macroeconomic PEU indicators show firm effects with p
values less than the .05 cutoff. Five of the seven indicators of the
uncertainty of inputs and services used by the firm have adequate reliability.
Only the most general of the ,four product demand indicators demonstrates
significant F test results. Four of the six competitive uncertainty
indicators satisfy the .05 criterion.
None of the four technological uncertainty variables met the .05
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criterion. As such, the technological uncertainty category was dropped
entirely from the subsequent analyses. Although management theory suggests
linkages between technological uncertainty and firm strategic decisions, the
empirical results cast doubts on the extent to which technological uncertainty
perceptions generalize across top managers in the same firm. Although
individual characteristics--such as functional area backgrounds--may account
for the perceptual differences, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper.
For each of the uncertainty measurement items with F test ratios
significant at the .05 level, the responses of managers within each firm were
averaged to obtain a mean response. The analyses reported in the remainder of
the paper used the mean scores for each companies' top management. Items not
satisfying the .05 criterion were not included in the analyses reported in the
next section.
Country and Industry Effects on Perceived Uncertainties
The tests for differences in the various PEUs across countries and
industries involved a two-factor analysis of variance model. All of the PEUs
with adequate reliabilities in Tables 4A and 4B were included in the analyses.
Each firm was classified into one of six countries and one of the eight
single-digit International standard Industrial Classification (ISlC) codes
represented in the sample (see Table 1). As was the case with the ANOVA
reliability tests reported above, the sample sizes within each factor subgroup
were unequal, indicating the regression approach to ANOVA was appropriate.
Table 5 reports the test statistics for industry and country effects and
the sample sizes for each ANOVA. F statistics were calculated treating the
effect to be tested as the last variable added. This procedure has the
attribute that the tests are invariant to the ordering of effects in the
regression model.
*************************
Put Table 5 here
*************************
The results indicate support for the hypothesis (HI) that managers'
political, government policy, and macroeconomic uncertainty perceptions differ
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significantly across countries but not across industries. All of the
political, policy, and macroeconomic uncertainty variables differ
significantly across countries. The finding that the perceived uncertainty of
armed conflict differs across industry groups was not anticipated. This
result may be due to differences in vulnerability to armed conflict across
industries depending on the nature of the industries' activities.
The two-factor ANOVA results for the input, demand, and competitive
uncertainties are more difficult to interpret than those for political,
policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties. As stated in H2 above, the
hypothesis was that both country and industry effects would be significant in
explaining differences in these PEUs. In fact, only three of the input
uncertainties show country effects significant at the .05 level. None of the
industry effects are significant. Thus, neither country nor industry effects
provide much explanatory power across most of the input, market demand, and
competitive uncertainties.
There are two related explanations for this finding. One possibility is
that defining industries at the single-digit ISIC code places firms in
industry categories that are too broad to capture industry effects.
Alternatively, following Ting (1988) and Lessard (1988), it may be the case
that any industry grouping, no matter how refined, would fail to provide
significant explanatory power because the uncertainties are unique to the
environmental circumstances and distinctive characteristics of individual
firms. That is, perceived input, competitive. and demand uncertainties may be
so idiosyncratic that no generalizations can be made to other firms.
In order to evaluate the possibility that narrower industry
classifications could result in significant industry effects consistent with
hypothesis two, the firms in the largest single-digit ISlC category in the
sample. manufacturing (ISlC 3000), were reclassified into two-digit ISlC
categories. Of the 84 manufacturing firms, 31 firms were food, beverage, and
tobacco manufacturers (ISlC 31) and 29 were manufacturers of chemicals and
chemical, rubber. and plastic products (ISlC 35). The remaining 24 firms were
scattered among the other seven two-digit manufacturing categories. ANOVA
results using the six country categories and two two-digit ISlC categories (31
17
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and 35) were consistent with those reported in Table 5. Two-digit industry
effects were generally not significant at the .05 level. The one exception
was uncertainty regarding changes in competitors' strategies which showed a
significant (p < .01) two-digit industry effect.
These results provide further evidence that perceptions of input,
product demand, and competitive uncertainties are idiosyncratic to firms. The
results are consistent with Ting (1988) and Lessard's (1988) contention that
many risks are firm or project-specific. One exception, uncertainty regarding




The measurement instrument developed in this research proved to have
adequate reliability across managers within firms for most of the perceived
uncertainty items. While previous research indicates that individual
characteristics may influence uncertainty perceptions, the reliabilities
reported in Tables 4A and 4B demonstrate agreement among top managers within
firms as to the uncertainty associated with a variety of environmental
components. This finding is important since it allows researchers to treat
the uncertainty items with adequate reliability as measuring shared
perceptions across top management team members rather than perceptions
idiosyncratic to individual managers. Top management's shared uncertainty
perceptions are more likely to influence organizational strategic decisions
than individual-specific perceptions.
Of the thirty-five uncertainty indicators, twenty-one had F test ratios
significant at the .05 level. While managers within firms generally agreed on
the uncertainty of political, government policy, macroeconomic, input, and
competitive items, there was much less agreement on the product market and
technology uncertainty items.
The findings indicate that managers are capable of differentiating the
uncertainties associated with distinct environmental components. This
conclusion raises serious doubts about the adequacy of organization theorists'
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conceptualization of uncertainty as a single unidimensional construct. It
would be surprising if the different types of managerial uncertainties did not
have very different implications for firm strategic decisions. For example,
corporate responses to political uncertainty should be quite different from
responses to competitive uncertainty. While this proposition has face
validity, such distinctions between types of uncertainties are largely absent
from organization theory research on uncertainty responses. Future research
on the relations between the various uncertainties and organization strategy,
structure, and process may provide insights that previous management research
treating uncertainty as a single construct could not.
The finding that managers distinguish a variety of environmental
uncertainties also challenges the tendency in strategy and international
business research to treat particular organizational uncertainties in
isolation from others. The approach to uncertainty in the strategy field
provides an important complement to existing international risk management
research focusing largely on political, policy, and macroeconomic
uncertainties. The use of financial or strategic maneuvers to hedge
particular corporate risk exposures may fail to take into consideration the
interrelationships and tradeoffs between exposures to various uncertain
environmental contingencies. Optimal risk management practices involve
simultaneous consideration of the full spectrum of corporate exposures to
environmental uncertainties (Miller, 1992; Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 1987; Shapiro
& Titman, 1986).
One limitation of the PEU instrument is its inclusion of a few items
that may not be particularly relevant to managers outside the region studied.
For example, the uncertainties of armed conflict and the results of economic
restructuring may not enter into managerial considerations in many developed
countries. In the future, researchers may want to adapt the particular items
incorporated in the PEU instrument to reflect the environmental components
relevant to managers in other countries or types of organizations. The
typology of uncertainties offered in Miller (1992) provides a basis for
generating alternative items. The measurement properties of additional or
alternative items to the scales should be carefully examined. While the
19
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empirical findings reported in this paper indicate managers' rankings of the
predictability of environmental components on Likert-type scales have some
desirable measurement properties, future research could examine the
reliability of these measures using samples from other countries.
Country and Industry ,Effects on PEUs
The study found systematic differences in political, policy, and
macroeconomic uncertainties across countries. This was expected. While
international risk management research has long advocated country risk
assessments focusing on political, policy, and macroeconomic risks, this study
contributes empirical evidence indicating managers' perceptions of these
uncertainties differ across countries.
Neither industry nor country accounted for differences in most input,
competitive, and market demand uncertainties. As noted in the discussion of
the ANOVA results, the relevance of industry cannot be entirely discounted
until further research is conducted using narrower industry classifications.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that while managers may receive useful
insights into political, policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties by conducting
country-level evaluations, such evaluations offer little information regarding
a number of uncertain contingencies vital to the success of an investment
project.
In assessing foreign investment risks, the findings of this study
suggest that managers will gain insights by considering the general
environmental (macroeconomic, political, and government policy) context of the
host country, but country-level assessments need to be supplemented with firrn-
specific, or even investment-specific, risk considerations. For general
environmental components, the uncertainty perceptions of managers within a
country appear to be widely shared across industries. Nevertheless, a
comprehensive assessment of the risk exposures associated with foreign
investment requires consideration of input, product market demand, and
competitive uncertainties. Risk exposures to this latter set of environmental
contingencies may be firm or investment-specific and as such, merit analyses




This study developed and tested a perceived environmental uncertainty
measurement instrument grounded in strategy and international management
theory. The instrument avoids the shortcoming of previous organization theory
research conceptualizing uncertainty as a single unidimensional construct. By
establishing a distinct multidimensional approach to measuring perceived
uncertainties, this study lays the groundwork for future research examining
uncertainty perceptions and organizational responses to the environmental
uncertainties encountered in international business.
Tests for country effects on managers' uncertainty perceptions supported
the relevance of country-level assessments of political, policy, and
macroeconomic uncertainties. On the other hand, countrY analyses proved
inadequate for determining competitive, input, and market demand
uncertainties. These findings suggest the need for supplemental risk analyses
beyond the country assessments advocated in the international risk management
literature.
The results did not support strategy researchers' contention that some
uncertainties differ systematically across industries. Rather, the findings
regarding competitive, input, and market demand uncertainties provide initial




1.The study used a Spanish version of the survey instrument prepared by the
author and three other bilingual individuals. This committee approach to
translation is one of the methods recommended by Brislin (1980). Appendix A
is a back translation written from the Spanish questionnaire.
2.An implication of the sampling procedure is that some of the reliability
measures most commonly used in management research, such as Cronbach's (1951)
alpha or other inter-rater measures, are not appropriate here. Such measures
require that there be a basis for classifying the respondents from each firm
into distinct categories. Functional area backgrounds and position are two
examples of categories used in multiple respondent organizational research.
In the case of Cronbach's alpha, categorization of respondents is necessary in
order to generate a unique correlation matrix and only those firms with data
from all three respondents could be included in the reliability estimate. For
this data set, a classification of managers by method (interview for the first
manager versus questionnaire for managers two and three) would differentiate
one of the three managers. No differentiation could be made, however, between
the two questionnaire respondents.
The ANOVA approach to reliability estimation described in the next
section has the advantages that (1) it does not require categorization of
respondents and (2) it uses the data from all firms in the sample rather than
solely those with the full set of three respondents.
3.For a discussion of the interpretation of ANOVA F ratios as measures of
reliability see Dansereau, Alutto, and Yammarino (1984).
4.As explained earlier, the F test uses a ratio of the firm mean square to the
error mean square. Inclusion of a single-respondent firm does not increase
the error sum of squares nor its associated degrees of freedom. Hence,
inclusion of the single-manager firms does not change the error mean square.
Nevertheless, the single-manager firms do contribute additional information
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about the firm mean square. While each single-manager firm increases the
total between firm variance, each also adds a degree of freedom to the
denominator when calculating the firm mean square. Hence, inclusion of the
single-manager firms in the ANOVA reliability F tests provides additional
information but does not bias the F test results.
ANOVA F test results generated using only the 155 firms with multiple
respondents were broadly consistent with the reported results for the full 211
firms sample. All of the significant (p < .OS) perceived uncertainty F tests
reported in tables 4A and 48 were also significant using the subsample of 155
firms. The subsample tests also indicated three other PEU indicators had
significant reliability based on their F statistics (interest rate
uncertainty, p:.020, uncertainty of client preferences, p:.041, and
uncertainty of product quality changes, p=.038). Hence, the results reported
in tables 4A and 48 are more conservative than the results obtained when
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In this section, we would like you to describe the environment in which your
company operates. In the primary industry and country where you work,
evaluate the aspects of your environment. Indicate if the factors are easy or
difficult to predict.
1 = Easy to predict, 7 = Unpredictable.
Predictable Unpredictable
1. Government and policies
a. Ability of the party in
power to maintain control
of the government.
b. Threat of armed conflict.
c. Tax policies.
d. Monetary policy.
e. Prices controlled by the
government.
f. National laws affecting
international business.
g. Legal regulations affect-
ing the business sector.
h. Tariffs on imported goods.
i. Enforcement of existing
laws.
j. Public service provision.
2. Economy
a. Inflation rate.
b. Exchange rate with dollar.
c. Interest rate.




































































































by your company.3. Resources and services used
a. Availability of trained
labor.
b. Labor and union problems.
c. Quality of inputs, raw
materials, and components.
d. Availability of inputs, raw
materials, and components.
e. Prices of inputs, raw
materials, and components.
f. Transportation system within
the country.
g. Transportation system to
foreign countries.
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
27
3
3
3
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3
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4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
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5
5
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